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STUDENT NOTES
MARRIAGE BELOW THE STATUTORY AGE-EFFECT
COHABITATION AFTER ARRIVING AT THAT AGE.

OF

A statute in Ohio' declared that male persons eighteen years of
age and females who were sixteen could be joined in marriage-provided that male persons under twenty-one and females under eighteen
should first obtain the consent of their parents. On April 5, 1877, James
Dick, twenty-one, married Irena Holtz, who did not become sixteen
until May 1st. Parental consent, as required by the statute, was not
given to the marriage. After the marriage had subsisted for two
weeks, the wife's mother, actuated by malice toward the son-in-law,
induced her daughter to separate from him and return to the home
of her parents. Evidence showed, however, that Dick and his childwife, even while living apart, still considered each other as husband
and wife, and that hey both surreptitiously exchanged letters placed
in a gate post. The wife's letters bore such salutations as "Dear Husband," "Kind Husband," and were signed "Irena Dick," showing the
affection of a loving wife. Such relations continued from April 5,
when the marriage was contracted, until September 1, four months
after the wife had reached the statutory age of sixteen. Dick then
sued the parents for maliciously causing his child-wife to separate
from him, and recovered a judgment of $2,000. The parents defended
on the ground that the marriage of their daughter to Dick was invalid in that it was contracted without parental consent before she
had arrived at the age required by the statute. But the Supreme Court
of Ohio, in sustaining the judgment, held that, although forbidden by
statute, nevertheless, the marriage became irrevocable when the wife
cohabited with her husband after she had reached the statutory age of
sixteen.? The direct tenor of this decision is that a marriage voidable
because of nonage, or lack of parental consent, becomes perfectly
valid and binding if ratified by cohabitation after the disability of
nonage has been removed.
It will be observed that cohabitation does not necessarily imply or
encompass sexual intercourse. Certainly it does not mean sexual relations alone. Properly speaking, the term "cohabitation" connotes living
together as husband and wife, and enjoying mutually the society, conBortium and conjugal bliss, Incident to the marital status.* It is agreed
that the cohabitation of the parties in the case given was not of the
highest order. This could not be when the marriage had been split
asunder at the Instance of a, meddlesome mother. But even though
"Rev. Stats., Sec. 6384.
2Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio State 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791 (1884).
'1Madden, Domestic Relations, pp. 67 and 148.
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the husband and wife lived apart, the intent to remain married continued. Indisputably it was evinced by the letters Interchanged between them that they still considered each other as husband and
wife. And in the estimation of the court this of itself constituted the
cohabitation necessary to ratify the hitherto voidable marriage, notwithstanding sexual intercourse after the wife reached sixteen was
not shown.
At common law a marriage contracted below the age of seven
was absolutely void; marriage after reaching the age of fourteen for
boys and twelve for girls was just as valid as was an adult marriage;
whereas a marriage between the ages of seven and fourteen for boys,
and between seven and twelve for girls, being inchoate and Imperfect,
could be avoided by either party before or after reaching the age of
consent. But if upon reaching the age of consent the parties to a marriage, voidable on account of nonage, continued to live together and
cohabit, this was a sufficient affirmance and ratification of the hitherto
voidable marriage.' Moreover, the consent of parents was not essential
at common law to make a voidable marriage valid if cohabitation took
place after the parties had reached the age of consent.5
Most states have enacted legislation increasing above the common
law level the ages at which marriage may be contracted. The most
generally adopted standard is eighteen for males and sixteen for
femalesO the rule in fifteen jurisdictions. But judicial pronouncements
under the statutes have almost invariably adopted the common law
view that a marriage voidable when contracted because of nonage becomes valid absolutely, if ratified by cohabitation after reaching the
reqqired statutory age.1 A recent New York case enunciates this doctrine and appears to represent the law as it exists in most American
states: A mother sought to annul the marriage of her son on the
grounds of nonage. Evidence showed that after the son reached the
age required by statute, he had cohabited with his wife. In holding
the marriage valid, the court declared: "A marriage contract entered
into before the requisite statutory age is voidable; but if after arrivIng at that age the Infant continues In the marital relation, he Is conclusively presumed to have ratified his contract. This is not only the
law but a different holding would be a monstrous doctrine and contrary to public policy."8
The writer subscribes to the position taken by the New York
court as being both sound and salutary. The statutory age required for
marriage corresponds In a large measure to the age of majority, when
'Ibid., Sec. 13, pp. 28-29.
6Vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. 1, Sec. 30, p. 119.
*Ibid., Sec. 29, pp. 115-116.
I Smith v. Smith, 84 Ga. 440, 11 S. E. 496 (1880); Power8 v.Poweers,
138 Ga. 64, 74 S. E. 759 (1912); Rtate v. Parker,106 N. C. 711, 11 S. 1l.
517 (1890); May v. Meade, et al., 236 Mich. 109, 210 N. W. 305 (1926);
Herrman, et al. v. Herrman, et al., 93 Misc. Rep. 315, 156 N. Y. Supp.
688 (1916); Holtz v. Dick, supra, note 2.
$Long v. Baxter, 77 Misc. Rep. 630, 138 N. Y. Supp. 505 (1916).
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Infants are deemed capable at law to make ordinary binding contracts. It cannot be doubted that most contracts made by infants
before reaching that age are voidable, and that such contracts may be
2
ratified by them after reaching twenty-one. No logical reason can be
given why this rule should not apply with equal effect to the marriage
"contract." Certainly if upon reaching the required ages, the parties
signify their desire to continue the marriage relation by cohabiting
With each other, this would be cogent evidence that the marriage had
proved satisfactory and that the parties desired to ratify their voidable "contract".
That a marriage, voidable for lack of age, becomes valid and binding upon cohabitation after reaching the required statutory age, Is
evidenced by the number of cases showing conviction for bigamy
when a subsequent marriage was contracted.' 0 Certainly one could not
be convicted of bigamy unless a valid prior marriage subsisted at the
time of the second marriage. Of course the same convictions would
have resulted had the first marriage been voidable only, for a voidable
1
But in every inmarriage is valid until set aside by judicial decree.
stance the courts in the bigamy cases cited proceeded further, and
held that the voidable marriages had been ratified by cohabitation
after reaching the ages set out in the statutes, thus making them perfectly valid. Therefore a conviction for bigamy was proper when a
second marriage was contracted.
Moreover it is submitted that the same practical result has been
reached, even though parental consent was not given to the initial
marriage." As at common law, it seems that the salient factor in
making the marriage voidable at the outset Is nonage, rather than
lack of parental consent; and cohabitation after reaching the statutory age cures both defects in the hitherto imperfect marriage."
Let us now discuss the problem in Kentucky: Is the marriage
of a boy under sixteen or a girl under fourteen (the statutory ages)
valid, If ratified by cohabitation after reaching those ages? It is contended that Kentucky follows the general rule, and that cohabitation
after attaining the ages required by the statute confirms and makes
absolutely valid the marriage which up to that time was voidable,
either by the party under age or his next friend. Because of the
dearth of adjudicated cases involving this point it must be said that
this conclusion Is reached by adverting to only one Kentucky decision,
and by properly interpreting the Kentucky statutes which bring the
problem within their purview.
'Williston on Contracts, Sec. 239, p. 463.
'Walls v. State, 32 Ark. 565 (1877); State v. Cone. 36 Wis. 498,
57 N. W. 50 (1893); State v. Yoder, 113 Minn. 503, 130 N. W. 10 (1911);
State v. Parker,supra, note 7.
"Kibler v. Ktbler, 180 Ark. 1152, 24 S. W. (2d) 867 (1930). Also
cases cited in footnote 7.
" Vernon v. Vernon, Ohio Decisions 365, Wkl. Law Bul. 237 (1891).
'18 R. C. L. Marriage, Sec. 78, p. 447.
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Section 2097, enacted in 1928 as amending Section 2100, expressly
prohibits and declares void a marriage if, when contracted, the male
is under sixteen, or the female is under fourteen years of age. This
section also prohibits bigamous marriages, as well as intermarriage
between whites and negroes.
Section 2100, passed in 1893, is equally emphatic, and states that
courts having proper jurisdiction may declare void a marriage which
was contracted without parental consent before reaching the requisite statutory ages, and which as -not been ratied by cohabitation
after that age.
Section 2115, which became law in 1894, enunciates that when one
of the parties to the marriage is within the statutory age, that person
or his next friend may have the marriageannuZled, but that the party
of proper age shall have no proceeding against the party under age
in avoiding the marriage.
There is an apparent conflict between these sections of Kentucky
law, regarding the validity of child marriages. Section 2097 declares
them void; Sections 2100 and 2115 declare them voidable. Moreover
the objection has been interposed that Section 2097 was meant to
nullify Sections 2100 and 2115, since it was passed in 1928 as amendatory to Section 2100 which was enacted in 1893. This would make a
marriage under age void, and not voidable merely. This objection,
however, seems ill-founded in the light of the Kentucky case cited in
footnote 15, infra. The objection is further weakened when it is known
that most courts generally construe apparently conflicting passages of
the law in such a manner as to lend validity to each of them.
Construing conjointly, then, Sections 2097, 2100, and 2115 as set
out above, it will appear that a marriage within the statutory age in
Kentucky is not void, as Section 2097 purports to make it, but is void'
able only" at the suit of the party under age. This position is distinctly upheld by the dictum in the Kentucky case adverted to above
1
which case was determined four years after section 2097 became law. '
In the course of the opinion the court said: "It is very plain that
notwithstanding Section 2097 positively declares a marriage void when
at the time it is consumated the male is under sixteen, or the female
is under fourteen, yet the marriage under Section 2100 may be avoided
in a court of equity, if the marriage was contracted without the consent of the parent." And altho the question of cohabitation was not
involved in the above litigation, without doubt this case subscribes
to the proposition that in Kentucky, where the only impediment to
marriage is the nonage of one of the parties, such marriage is valid
absolutely, unless it is annulled by the party under age, or his next
friend, as stipulated in Section 2100 and Section 2115. This makes
Kentucky's position emphatic in holding that where one of the par"Ky. Statutes, Secs. 2100 and 2115.
1
5 rummies Creek Coal Corp. v. Napier, 246 Ky. 569, 66 S. W. (2d)
339 (1932).
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ties is under age when the marriage is solemnized such marriage is
voidable only and not void. In fact, guided by this decision, it would
hardly be dogmatic to reiterate with certitude this conclusion, and to
relegate into oblivion the notion that a marriage in- Kentucky is void
where the only impediment is lack of age. This result is indispensable in sustaining our major premise that a marriage under age may
be ratified by later cohabitation, for if such marriage were to be declared void ab initio, it is very palpable that such marriage could not
later be ratified, inasmuch as a void marriage, is invalid in toto from
the very date of its inception.
Furthermore, the above adjudication goes a long way toward saying that a marriage statute apparently mandatory in all respects may
be interpreted as mandatory in certain parts and directory only in
other parts.10 This principle has been well exemplified in the state
of Maryland. The statute in that jurisdiction declares that "no person shall be joined in marriage until a license has been obtained."
Moreover the state has consistently refused to sanction the common
law marriage as violating both the letter and the spirit of the statute.
Yet, in a recent decision it was held that a religious ceremony was
the only essential to a valid marriage, and that the other provisions
7
Bearing in mind the above disin the statute were directory only.
cussion, it would be most reasonable to entertain this theory with
regard to Kentucky statute, Section 2097; holding it mandatory with
respect to bigamous and miscegenetic marriages thereby making such
marriages void absolutely, and directory only with regards to nonage,
making such marriage merely voidable, and capable of subsequent affirmance as well as disaffirmance. This view is materially strengthened when we note that Kentucky Statutes, Section 2098, expressly
legitimates the offspring of a marriage where the only disability is
nonage, whereas it brands with the stigma of illegitimacy the descendants of incestuous and miscegenetic marriages.
Kentucky Statutes, Section 2100, says that a court having general
equity jurisdiction may declare void a marriage where the male at
the time of marriage was under sixteen or the female was under fourteen, which marriage was contracted without the consent of the parent, and which has not been ratified by cohabitation after those ages.
The only logical interpretation of this section of the law is that,
although, voidable at the outset because of nonage and want of parental consent, such marriage, regardless of its previous deficiencies
and discrepancies, becomes a valid marriage, which cannot be annulled if and when it is ratified by cohabitation after reaching sixteen
for males and fourteen for females. Section 2100 is couched in negative language. It declares that a marriage when the parties thereto
are under age, may be declared void if cohabitation has not taken
place between the parties after reaching the statutory ages. This is
26Madden, Domestic Relations, Sec. 23, pp. 64-65.
't Fechley v. Feehley, 129 Md. 565, 99 Ati. 663 (1916).
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tantamount to saying that such marriage would be binding absolutely
and would not be amenable to annulment, if cohabitation had taken
place after reaching those ages.
As eminent an authority as Vernier's tells us that In securing an
annulment, the basis of which is nonage, "no annulment shall be
granted in these jurisdictions (of which Kentucky Is one) if after the
removal of the disability of nonage, the parties have freely cohabited
as husband and wife." The direct consequence of this statement is
that the marriage at the outset Is voidable, and that it becomes valid,
binding and perfect in all respects by cohabitation after reaching the
required ages. This view is entirely consonant with the writer's Interpretation of Kentucky Statute 2100 and is in accord with both
the common law and the general rule most widely adopted under the
statutes.
In connection with the problem just discussed, another question
presents itself. Is the marriage of a male under sixteen or a female
under fourteen valid until declared to be a nullity by a court having
proper jurisdiction? An attempted determination of this question is
tendered.
Let us assume that when this marriage was solemnized the only
disability was nonage, and that other statutory requirements were
fully complied with. In that case the marriage would be voidable,
but valid until set aside by a court decree.
Incestuous marriages and miscegenetic marriages contravene the
voice of nature; they offend decency and morals; and are positively
interdicted in most jurisdictions. Moreover, such marriages are void
ab initio; they can never be ratified; and generally need no judicial
decree declaring their nullity." In addition the progeny of such marriages have in most instances been pronounced illegitimate both by
statute and by judicial decision.- On the other hand where the only
impediment is nonage, although such marriage may be indiscreet and
unwise, and may subject youth and inexperience to the arts of the
cunning and unscrupulous, yet it is lacking in the vicious and corrupting properties of a marriage within the prohibited degrees of affinity
and consanguinity, or of an Interracial marriage.
Doubtless these aspects have had an appreciable Influence upon
the courts, for almost universally they have held that a marriage
below the statutory age, if above the common law age, is voidable
"Vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. 1, Sec. 51, p. 259, note 9
(1931).
"Madden, Domestic Relations, Sec. 15, pp. 33-36, See. 17, p. 17,
pp. 38-39; Vernier, American Family Laws, Vol. 1, Sec. 38, pp. 173-179;
Sec. 44, pp. 204-205.
"Ky. Statutes, See. 2008, "The issue of all illegal marriages shall
be legitimate, except those of an incestuous marriage and those of a
marriage between a white person and a negro or a mulatto." Moore v.
Moore, 30 K. L. R. 383, 98 S. W. 1027 (1907).
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And what is more, most courts have gone a step
only, and not vold.
further and have explicitly held that such voidable marriages are
valid for all civil purposes until annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction.21

Marriage within the required statutory age is a marriage on condition subiequent, the conditions being its disaffirmance by either party
thereto before ratification after reaching that agei or annulment
thereof by a proper court. Like other valid contracts In this respect,
the obligation arises when the marriage is instituted, and it remains
binding unless and until the conditions happen. This Is just another
way of saying that a marriage, voidable for nonage, Is valid and binding just as Is the most perfect marriage, until its nullity is pronounced
by a competent tribunal. Without doubt this Is the majority view;
and judging from the array of authority cited in footnote 22 above,
and from other sources at the writer's command, it would appear that
this principle Is so firmly entrenched in the law as to be incontrovertible.
Reverting more particularly to our Kentucky statutes (Sections
2097, 2115 and 2100 8upra) we may, safely conclude that a marriage
contracted under the sole disability of nonage is voidable only, and
not void,"' for Section 2115 expressly provides that the party under
age may have the marriage annulled. If the marriage were void
ab initio, it should be quite superfluous to specify a judicial procedure
whereby such marriage may be declared void; Since a marriage under
age, then, is voidable only, just what Is the legal status of that marriage during the interim between its contraction and subsequent annulment by a competent court, or ratification after reaching the statutory age?
Only one decision Involving this precise question has been handed
down by the Kentucky Court, but from that 'decision alone we are
able to deduce this emphatic position: A marriage below the statutory age if above the common law age is valid and binding absolutely
in Kentucky until it is declared null and void by a court in equity.
In order to sustain this contention it will not be amiss to discuss the
Kentucky case. One Napier had been awarded compensation under
the Workmen's Compensation Law as a result of the accidental death
mVernier, American Family Laws, Vol. 1, Sec. 29, p. 118; State v.
Lowell, 78 Minn. 166, 80 N. W. 877 (1899).
"Willts v. Willits, 76 Nebr. 28, 107 N. W. 379 (1916), 18 R. C. I&,
Marriage, Sec. 70, p. 442; Sturgis v. Sturgis, 51 Ore. 10, 93 Pac. 696
(1908); Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation, and Domestic Relations, 6th ed., Sec. 14, p. 19 (1921); Holtz v. Dick, supra, note 2; Wall&
v. State and State v. Cone, supra, note 10; State v. Lowell (Minn.),
46 L. R. A. 440, 80 N. W. 877 (1899); Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468,
85 Am. Dec. 658 (1863).
S Madden, Domestic Relations, Nonage, Sec. 13. Kentucky by Statute, Sec. 2115, extends the privilege of annulment only to the person
under the disability of nonage, or his friend.
24Supra, notes 14 and 15.
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of Dillard Napier during the scope of his employment for the Crummlnes Creek Coal Corporation. Kentucky statute 4894 provided that
such compensation should continue until death, or until subsequent
legal marriage. After the award of compensation had been made,
Napier married May Hicks, age thirteen. The company was apprised
of this marriage, and sought to have the compensation stopped, whereupon Mr. Napier endeavored to show that his marriage was not legal
or valid. But the court held that under Section 2115 of the Kentucky
statutes, only the party under age could contest the validity of a marriage contracted below the required age, and that he was denied the
remedy. Napier's marriage to May Hicks, who was under age when
the marriage was solemnized, was held valid, and his compensation
was stopped.21 Not only does this case support the proposition that
a marriage under age is valid until avoided by the party under age,
as stipulated in Section 2115 but it also unequivocably modifies Section 2097, which declared a marriage under age void, and holds that
such marriage is voidable only. Without doubt if this marriage under
age had been void ab initio, Napier would never have lost his compensation, since a void marriage is not a legal marriage in the contemplation of the law, and his compensation could stop only upon contractIng a legal marriage. But the court did not hesitate to hold his marriage legal, even though his child wife was only thirteen when he
married her. This decision definitely settles the question in Kentucky that a marriage under age is voidable only at the instance of
the party under age and that such marriage is valid in all respects
until and unless the party under age avails himself of the statutory
remedy before cohabitation between the parties after reaching the
required age.
Our path is further illumined when we note the position taken by
the state of Arkansas. The statutes relative to marriage in that state
are similar In most respects to those in Kentucky, and it is rather impressive to observe that in a decision determined there in 1930," the
word "void" in the language of the statute was construed as meaning
"voidable." Furthermore, the court went on to say that the marriage of
a person under the statutory age was a voidable marriage, and that
such marriage imposed the obligations of the marital status upon the
contracting parties until its nullity had been pronounced by the proper
court. The unmistakable import of this decision is that a marriage
under age is voidable, but valid temporarily at least, and that Its
validity subsists until the marriage Is abrogated by a judicial decree.
When we consider the nature of marriage we are by no means
overwhelmed at this result. The state is vitally interested in the
institution of marriage, not only because it is the foundation of the
American home, but also because it is irretrievably rooted In our complex social structure. Therefore it is right that the state should regu5rummies Creelk Coal Corporation v. Napier, supra, note 15.
"KibIer v. KIbl2, 180 Ark. 1152, 24 S. W. 867 (1930).
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late marriage, and should specify by statute just who may marry and
Just at what age marriage may be contracted. The law has always
deemed infants to be affected with an imbecility of judgment, and for
that reason, incapable of giving their consent to marry before they
reached a certain age. Child marriages militate against the proper
education and culture of youth; and because most boys and girls are
of innate unstable disposition, early marriages are frequently conducive to unhappiness for both parties throughout life. It is to obviate
these conditions that statutes have been enacted requiring a relatively
mature age before the marriage union may be entered. Without doubt
such statutes were designed primarily to protect adolescent boys and
girls from the precipitancy of their own injudicious acts when contemplating the marriage relation. But regardless of the undesirability
of child marriages, if the only disability is nonage, it does not require
the astuteness of a philosopher to apprehend that, once the marriage
has been consummated, courts will go a long way in lending validity
to such marriage since the parties could never assume their original
status. Public policy and the importance of the martial status itself
dictate such a procedure.
To summarize, the writer submits that the following propositions
represent the law In Kentucky:
1. The marriage of a boy under sixteen or of a girl under fourteen would be perfectly valid if ratified by cohabitation after reaching those ages, although parental consent to the initial marriage was
not obtained.
2. The marriage of a boy, under sixteen or of a girl under fourteen is not void, but is voidable only, and is valid for all civil purposes
until annulled by a proper judicial pronouncement.
TowN HALL.
WILLS-ADVANCEMENTS.
An advancement is a gift from a parent, or one who stands in
loco parentis, to a child, which is to be charged to the child in the
distribution of the parent's estate. Such gifts are usually made for
the purpose of establishing or "advancing" the child in life. When
so made it is unnecessary to present evidence that the parent intended the gift to be charged. The intent is presumed.
The doctrine of charging children with gifts from their parents
in the settlement of the estate of the parents is of ancient origin. As
might be surmised, It is designated to place all of the children on an
equal footing and to prevent an undue preference of those who receive
substantial gifts during the lifetime of the parents.
Strictly speaking, an advancement can exist only where the parent dies wholly or partially intestate. By analogy, however, the principle has been extended to cover gifts made after the execution of a
will in which the children are named as devisees or legatees. It also

